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Abstract 
Information systems and networks are highly susceptible to attacks in the form of 
intrusions. One such attack is by the masqueraders who impersonate legitimate users. 
Masqueraders can be detected in anomaly based intrusion detection by identifying the 
abnormalities in user behavior. This user behavior is logged in log files of different types. In 
our research we use the score based technique of Singular Value Decomposition to address 
the problem of masquerade detection on a unix based system. We have data collected in 
the form of sequential unix commands ran by 50 users. SVD is a linear algebraic technique, 
which has been previously used for applications like facial recognition. We present 
experimental results and we analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of this SVD-based 
masquerade detection. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Computer-system logs provide a glimpse into the states of a running system. 
Instrumentation occasionally generates short messages that are collected in a system-
specific log. The content and format of logs can vary widely within different systems and 
also with components within a system [1]. Log Analysis is done to achieve goals like 
debugging, performance monitoring, fault detection, profiling and prediction. Log analysis 
can be used to find problems, define operational profiles, and even pro-actively prevent 
issues. Modern software-based systems collect information about their activity in logs. The 
information in the logs can therefore be used to trace the authenticity of the system’s 
activities. Logs can be in any form like single files, collections of files, databases, or streams 
of data in a raw text format [2]. 
 
A strong logging infrastructure is essential for supporting the variety of applications 
is described here. It requires at least two features: log generation and log storage. Most 
general-purpose logs are raw or in an unstructured text format. The dataset used for this 
research is from one of the statistical science publications [4] by Professor Matthias 
Schonlau on intrusion detection in computer systems. This dataset provides UNIX command 
line data of 50 users collected over a period of several months. The dataset has been 
seeded with masqueraders, which have been used for the testing phase of our model. 
 
The base for this research is to create a user profile indicating a genuine behavioral 
pattern and then test the actual behavior against the legitimate pattern to detect the 
abnormal behavior. The technique we use is Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), which is a 
matrix factorization technique. This technique takes a highly variable and diverse input 
matrix and reduces it to a smaller dimension, which will yet very well expose the 
substructure of the original input matrix [9]. The SVD is trained by a set of legitimate 
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commands provided as input in the form of a matrix, which gets transformed to a resultant 
matrix. This trained model is then used over the test data, which is a combination of both, 
legitimate and masquerade activities.  We have done our experiments on the Schonlau’s 
masquerade detection dataset for 50 users and got good results.  
Further, chapter 2 will highlight the extensive literature survey that was done to 
support the research done. Chapter 3 talks about masquerade detection, the various 
techniques that can be used to carry out detection and its relation to machine learning. 
Chapter 4 explains the technique of Singular Value decomposition used for masquerade 
detection, the dataset and the algorithm. Chapter 5 and 6 contain the experimental results, 
its explanation and conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
Masquerade Detection 
2.1 Introduction 
In the modern world of computer security, a lot of effort has been put to prevent intrusions 
or attacks to a computer system. Masqueraders often attack systems that solely depend on 
password validations or login credentials. Once they have access to a user account they 
perform malicious activities, which they are not authorized for. 
A masquerader is someone who tries to act like a legitimate user and secretly perform 
operations, which are unlikely to be performed by a normal, legitimate user. These attacks 
are often seen happening within an organization and they remain hidden and are difficult to 
find. 
Intrusion detection performs vulnerability assessment to manage the security of computer 
networks and systems. It gathers information from several sources that record and maintain 
the system behavior on a timely basis and contain impressions of unusual or odd incidents.  
In fig.1, A Network intrusion detection system is used to detect malicious activities by 
trapping traffic at crucial points of a web application that travels in and out of the system. 
This information is then analyzed to detect intruders in a system. These systems are easy to 
deploy as they do not change or affect the overall infrastructure of the system. One of the 
drawbacks is that a large amount of data is gathered over a period of time, which can get 
hard to manage. 
Intrusion detection functions include: 
 Monitoring and analyzing both user and system activities 
 Analyzing system configurations and vulnerabilities 
 Assessing system and file integrity 
 Ability to recognize patterns that are typical of attacks 
 Analysis of abnormal activity patterns in system 
 Tracking user policy violations [7] 
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Figure 1. Detecting attacks on a network. [8] 
 
There are two techniques of intrusion detection namely anomaly based and signature based 
intrusion detection. 
 Anomaly based IDS: In an anomaly-based approach, the user profile or network traffic 
of the system is compared to a baseline formed by prior analysis carried out by the 
system. These baselines represent normal or acceptable states in a system. A massive or 
considerable deviation from this baseline generates an alarm in the intrusion detection 
system. 
 
 Signature based IDS: In this technique, elements like user activity or network activities 
are compared against a database of signatures, which represent malicious activities 
recorded previously over the system. In case of a new attack, there will be a time gap 
for that attack to be added to the signature database.  
  
5 
 
In this research, we consider the anomaly-based technique of intrusion detection by 
maintaining user profiles with a baseline of valid user activity to which the actual data is 
tested against. The SVD helps in detection of variance between the baseline and actual data 
in the UNIX environment. We assume each user to have his, own peculiar style or behavior 
in running UNIX commands. 
2.2 Machine Learning techniques: 
Machine Learning techniques are widely used in various applications like artificial 
intelligence, bio-informatics, data mining etc. A machine gets trained from previous 
experiences and then provides prediction or feedback on new situations that are unknown. 
There are two learning approaches in machine learning. 
1. Supervised learning:  
In our approach, SVD technique falls under the bracket of supervised learning 
where there is enough data available in advance that can be used to train a model for a 
good user. Once the model has extracted enough information from the existing dataset, 
it can be used to classify the valid user from the bad user (masquerader) in test data. 
 
2. Unsupervised learning:  
In unsupervised learning, we do not train a model in advance with available 
datasets. It performs classification of data into clusters and those clusters are later 
assigned class names. It’s an advantage in unsupervised learning, which can be used 
when you do not have the data available in advance or are unaware of the data fields. 
The results of unsupervised learning sometimes deviate from the human perception of a 
particular field or cluster to be important. It might end up considering other classes as 
important which are not expected. 
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2.3 Singular Value Decomposition 
Singular Value Decomposition is a supervised machine learning technique, which has a very 
popular application in facial recognition. Facial recognition is an important field of study 
used for identifying criminals, digital image processing and so on. For facial recognition, the 
face can be decomposed into small feature images known as the eigenfaces. The space 
covered by these eigenfaces is known as facespace. SVD is a technique, which mainly 
identifies and orders the dimensions along those datapoints, which exhibit most variation 
[9]. On identifying the most variations, it is easily possible to generate a very good 
approximation of the original dataset. That is one of the reason SVD is used for data 
reduction. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
Intrusion detection aims at the timely discovery of any activity that jeopardizes the 
integrity, availability, or the confidentiality of an IT system. Based on the activity it observes, 
an intrusion detection system (IDS) may be either of three types: host, network, or 
application [3]. A host IDS is usually set to audit the functionality of the underlying 
operating system, as it executes system calls, but can also be set to watch critical resources. 
Based on the classification scheme, an IDS is either misuse or anomaly. According to author 
Garcia and K.A.  Scotiabank the interest is in a problem, which is closely related to intrusion 
detection. The problem, which we call postmortem intrusion detection, is defined as 
follows: given a log file, find the point where the exploitation happened, if any. Thus, while 
intrusion detection tries to detect intrusions as they happen, postmortem intrusion 
detection monitors the system information that is offline with an intention to detect and 
locate the execution of the attack [3]. 
 
 The postmortem IDS stated by author Garcia and K.A.  Scotiabank use a novel 
combination of k-means and hidden markov model, which Garcia et altogether calls the 
KHMM. Since the IDS is a host based IDS, it also talks about T-stide. T-stide defines normal 
behavior by means of short-range correlations in the execution of system calls of a process. 
It is able to detect several common intrusions involving UNIX processes. T-stide uses a 
sliding window protocol to explore the user activity on the system, looking for any 
deviations from the profile of ordinary or expected system behavior [3]. 
 
The Garcia et al then suggests an approach to build an anomaly, learning-based, 
host-based intrusion detection model, where the working hypothesis is that an attack takes 
the form of an unusual sequence of system calls. In the test setup, the author assumes that 
the system has been compromised by an attack and that this intrusion has left some 
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information somewhere [3]. The first step of the mechanism is reduction where a lot of 
repetitive information is removed. Then, the approach uses a sliding window, which would 
take a certain threshold of events from beginning each time, and feed it to a classification 
system. The results of the classification system are compared with other techniques for 
performance checks. The classification is carried out using the KHMM technique [3]. 
 
The use of event co-occurrence scheme to preprocess the data before performing 
principal component analysis is one of the ways of intrusion detection. There are two steps 
to decide an input data as normal or intrusive. The initial step is extraction of features of the 
data. The second step is classification of the extracted features of the data. ECM (Event Co-
Occurrence Matrix) represents the causal relationship by converting a section of an event 
sequence to an event co-occurrence matrix. An element of the co-occurrence matrix 
represents the occurrence of pair of events in the event sequence within a scope size [5]. 
 
On feeding the ECM, the principal component analysis technique will generate an 
eigen co-occurrence matrix which is the output of the learning phase. On projection of the 
event co-occurrence matrix on the Eigen matrix, Y.Oyama obtains the feature vector. The 
main feature of their implementation was the co-occurrence matrix representation of the 
feature and the reduction using PCA [5]. 
 
Log Analysis is crucial and fundamental to System Administration in today’s world. 
Logs provide with an insight on exactly what is happening with the system that is being 
monitored. The article talks a lot about how as the systems vary the instrumentation that 
writes the log also varies. It discusses the advancements and the challenges associated to 
log analysis [1]. 
 
 The paper provides an idea of some of the most common applications of log analysis, 
describes some of the log types which can be analyzed and the methods of analyzing them, 
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and describes some of the challenges associated with it [1]. First, is debugging, in which he 
talks about some previous techniques like “printf” or “grep” commands that were used to 
understand the flaws of the system.  The simplest and most common use for a debug log is 
to grep for a specific message. If a server operator assumes that a program crashed due to a 
kind of a network failure, then he would try to look for a message in the server logs [1]. But 
debugging gets difficult when we don’t know what to search for or the log messages 
individually are misleading. Second, is performance monitoring, in which log analysis can 
help us improve resource allocation, bottleneck situations and preparing resource usage 
statistics for long term review. 
 
Security is another very useful application where logs can help detect fraudulent activities. 
Intrusion detection is the term that is used to describe this kind of log analysis. This 
approach needs real time monitoring of the data that will help prevent such mishaps. Log 
analysis for security may be signature based, in which the user tries to detect specific 
behaviors that are known to be malicious; or anomaly based, in which the user looks for 
shift from typical/normal or good behavior [1]. The other applications discussed are 
prediction and reporting and profiling. User’s footprint over the Internet is a very valuable 
piece of information and it can help detect shopping patterns, likes, and dislikes of the 
consumer. Logs that monitor characteristics of tasks from a cluster’s workload can be used 
for resource utilization profiling at large data centers that compute terabytes of data which 
cannot afford any downtime [1]. 
  
The paper also speaks about how the machine learning techniques can be used for the 
various applications dealing with log analysis. Machine-learning techniques, especially 
anomaly detection, are normally used to monitor failure messages that can help root cause 
issues in the system. Machine-learning tools usually require input data as numerical feature 
vectors. It is a cumbersome task to convert free-text log messages into meaningful feature 
vectors that can used to analysis of the system under concern [1]. 
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Chapter 4 
Singular Value Decomposition for Masquerade detection 
4.1 Eigen Vectors and Eigen Values 
An Eigen vector is a non zero value of a particular square matrix say A, such that the 
multiplication of that vector x with A is equal to a scalar value multiplication of the vector. 
The standard equation is as given below. 
                                             
In Linear Algebra, if a vector satisfies the above equation, then x is considered to the eigen 
vector of A and as the eigen value associated to the vector x. The figure given below 
would explain the relation [19]. 
         
                                         Figure 2: Eigen vector x and Eigen value  
In the diagram above we see, that matrix A stretches vector x where the direction of x does 
not change but only the magnitude changes. Thus x is a vector of A. In our technique, the 
user commands are parsed and placed in a matrix A, and the variation of data in the matrix 
is placed in covariance matrix [19]. The eigen vectors and eigen values for these matrices is 
calculated and these eigen vectors are then projected into a space called as the eigenspace. 
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More the value of the eigen vector, more important would be its corresponding eigen 
vector in contributing to the variance of the dataset that we provided. Thus, SVD uses eigen 
vector and eigen values to understand the high variance points in the data. 
4.2 Singular Value Decomposition for Face Recognition 
In Face Recognition, the images are expressed in terms of a covariance matrix and the eigen 
vectors for these matrix are calculated. The eigen vectors which represent the variations in 
the images are projected on a space called the face space. These vectors enclose this face 
space. When an image is projected on to the face space, the original image can be 
reconstructed using the eigen vectors [17]. In facial recognition technique after the column 
vector is constructed with the pixels of individual image, we subtract the mean pixel value 
of all the training input images at that position from the actual pixel value of all the images 
which was being projected. 
 
                                          Figure 3: Training Images [10] 
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The next figure contains the eigen faces for the training input set of images shown above. 
These images are further used for projection. 
 
Figure 4: Eigen faces of the images [10] 
We would now look at the projection of images. When a known, legitimate image is 
projected on the eigen space, the original image can be reconstructed. But when an 
unknown, invalid image is projected on the eigen space, the original image cannot be 
reconstructed. The next image shows the projection image for a known as well as an 
unknown image on the eigen space [17]. 
 
Figure 5: Projection of a known image 
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Figure 6: Projection of an unknown image 
 
4.3 Schonlau’s Dataset 
The dataset consists of UNIX commands ran by 50 different users. For each user the dataset 
consists of 15k commands. Genuine users run the first 5k commands and the remaining 10k 
commands are seeded with masqueraders and our algorithm aims at identifying the 
masqueraders from those 10k commands. The 10k commands are thought of as 100 blocks 
of 100 commands each. The algorithm would try to locate the masqueraded block out of 
the 100 blocks of commands. 
After the first 5000 commands, the probability of a masquerader block starts with 1%. If a 
block is a masquerader block, there is a probability of 80% that the next block too might be 
a masquerader block. Up to 5% of the test data i.e. the 10k commands can be masquerader 
blocks. The website also provides the location of masqueraders in the dataset to validate 
the results of the masquerade detection algorithm. The file has 50 columns for 50 different 
users, where each column has 100 values for 100 blocks of test data. The values in the 
columns are in the form of 1’s and 0’s. 1 represents a masquerade block and 0 represents a 
genuine user block.  
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Sample Dataset: 
 Here is a sequence for legitimate user commands for User 3 of the dataset. 
cpp 
sh 
xrdb 
cpp 
sh 
xrdb 
mkpts 
env 
csh 
csh 
csh 
sh 
 
 This is a sequence of commands by the masquerader who pretends to be User 3 
 egrep 
 egrep 
 egrep 
 java  
 java 
 make 
 .java_wr 
 expr 
 expr 
 dirname 
 basename 
 egrep 
 egrep 
 egrep 
 egrep 
 
The difference in the commands as well the sequence in which they are run would highlight 
this block as a masquerade block in the results of our implementation. 
 
 
  
15 
 
 
 Example of SVD 
SVD is based on linear algebraic expression which states that a rectangular matrix can be 
broken down into three matrices – a diagonal matrix U, a  diagonal matrix S and a transpose 
of orthogonal matrix V. 
 
 
Starting with a matrix A, 
 
 
So, inorder to find U, we need transpose of A 
 
 
Lets now find the eigen values and eigen vectors of the above matrix. 
 
Forming an equation, 
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Rearranging the equation gives us, 
 
Finally we get, 
 
Now we would substitute the eigen values in the equation, 
On substituting 12, 
 
On substituting 10, 
 
Thus the final matrix is where column one is eigen vector for value 12 and the second 
column is for value 10: 
 
On applying orthonormalization we get U as, 
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Similarly we need to find transpose of A x A for matrix V and follow the same steps. That 
gives us, 
 
The non-zero eigen values of U and V form the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix S. 
These valus are same for both U and V. We also add a zero column vector for proper 
dimensions. 
  
On multiplying all the three matrices we end up getting the original matrix A. 
 
This example clearly illustrates how a matrix gets decomposed into matrices [9] using the 
Singular Value Decomposition technique, which has been used for the user commands in 
the context of our project. 
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4.4 Algorithm for masquerade detection 
According to the dataset, the first 5K commands are legitimate, out of which we use the 
first 2K commands for training the system and the remaining 3K commands to form a 
threshold of genuine data. SVD would be applied to the training set of 2K commands. 
1. The training set gets divided into 20 blocks of 100 commands each forming an input 
matrix of 100 x 20. On applying SVD to this matrix, we get matrices for U, V and Sigma(S). 
Matrix A is given by Matrix U multiplied by Matrix S (Sigma) multiplied by transpose (T) of 
Matrix V. The size of each of them is 100 x 20, 20 x 20 and 20 x 20.  
A = U S V
T   
Where, A is 100 x 20 
2. The matrix U contains vital information about the input matrix A. We need to project the 
input matrix A on an Eigen space which is UT.  
UT  x   A  =  Output of training phase [20 x 20] 
3. The Threshold data set of 3k commands are divided into 30 blocks of 100 commands each 
which is 100 x 30 in dimension. We now project the threshold dataset on the eigen space 
(UT). 
UT   x   B  = Projection of Threshold data on the Eigen space [20 x 30]  
4.   Euclidean distance will be calculated between the threshold data projection and the 
training output where every column of threshold set will be compared to every other 
column of the training output and the minimum value would be selected. This results in 
generating the distance between training data and threshold data in the form of 30 scores. 
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5. The test data set consisting of 10k commands are divided into 100 blocks of 100 
commands each and are projected on the Eigen space just like the threshold dataset. 
UT  x   T  =  Projection of test data on the Eigen space [20 x 100] 
6. Euclidean distance will be calculated between the test data projection and the training 
output where every column of test set will be compared to every other column of the 
training output and the minimum value would be selected. This results in generating the 
distance between training data and test data in the form of 100 scores. 
7. The threshold dataset scores and the test dataset scores are then projected on a graph. 
The threshold scores form a threshold indicating the boundary, which represents 
commands from a legitimate user. The test data scores are projected to see instances 
where they are far apart from the threshold data scores, which indicate the masquerade 
blocks of data. 
 The scores from the test data were then compared to Schonlau’s result validation 
file, which provides the location of all the masqueraders in the test dataset. This helped to 
verify the performance of the algorithm on the dataset. The experiments were run on all 50 
users and results would be seen in the next section.   
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Chapter 5 
Experiments 
The charts contain the plotting of the threshold scores and the test data scores on a scatter 
plot. The main observation on the chart would be to see points where the test data scores 
are far apart form the threshold data scores.  
Fig 6 shows results for evaluating masquerade out of set of legitimate commands. On 
running the technique, the results contain 30 values that indicate the threshold and 100 values 
that represent the test data scores. Series 2 represents a single value for the threshold, which 
is an average of threshold values. This result indicates that none of the test data scores 
surpass the threshold, which indicates there has not been a masquerade attack for User 1.  
 
User 1 
  
No. of scores 
Figure 6: Scores for User 1 
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In fig 7 for User 2, the threshold value is 10.57 so all the test data points, which cross this 
range, would be considered to be as masquerade data points. Block 61 and 62 in the chart are 
far beyond the threshold and that is why these commands blocks of test data would be 
considered as masquerade blocks. The test dataset of 10k commands get divided into 100 
blocks of 100k commands each. The result indicates that block 61 and 62 are blocks of 
commands ran by the masquerader. 
 
User 2 
 
                                            No. of scores 
                                  Figure 7: Scores for User 2 
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 5000 blocks of commands with 100 commands in each block were tested as a part of the 
Testing Phase. Each of those blocks was identified as a masquerade or a non-masquerade 
block of commands.  Some of the blocks were identified as false positive alarm or false 
negative alarm. Table 1 indicates the total number of blocks in each category and the 
users that exhibited those alarms. 
 
 Analysis of results for 5000 blocks [False Positives, False Negatives/Error Free]: 
 
 
Category Number of blocks (Sum of 
blocks of users in a category) 
Users  
False Positives 13 6,37 
False Negatives 754 2,7,10,15,16,24,25,26,34,36,42,45, 
48 
No False 
Positives/Negatives 
2133 27,29,31,32,33,35,38,39,40,41,43, 
46,49,50 
 
Table 1: False Positive/Negative statistics 
 
Table 1 Specifies results for users, which had more intruder alarms than expected (False 
positives), lesser alarms than expected (False negatives) and those, which had no false 
positives or negatives. Rest of the command blocks (4233 blocks), were accurate and were 
neither false positive/negative or may belong to the category of having no masquerades. 
These include all the blocks that were identified as a masquerade or a non-masquerade 
block in the complete testing phase and if that identification was valid. 
 
 Statistics for masquerade free files: 
 No. Out of total users (%)  Error 
Masquerade Free Files in the 
dataset 
21 42%  
No 
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Masquerade Free Files 
detected by the system 
21 42% 
Table 2: Evaluation for Masquerade Free Files 
 
Table 2 indicates that our implementation of the technique could identify all the users, 
which did not have any masqueraders attacking them exactly. Out of 50 users, there were 
21 users with no masquerader commands. 
 
 Statistics of error free results 
 No. Of users Out of total users(%)  
Exact results 
(Results with no false or 
missing alarms) 
 
35 
 
70% 
Table 3: Evaluation of Exact results 
Table 3 shows there were exactly 35 users for which the results had no false positives and 
negatives. Based on the data in table 1 and table 2 exact results is the combined sum of 
masquerade Free Files and no False Positives/Negatives data set. Table 3 also shows 70% of 
total data is exact determination of the results. They are identified exact masquerader 
blocks as per the result set on Schonlau’s page [11]. 
 System Setup for execution: 
The code implementation for the SVD technique is done in Java using the Java SE 
development Kit 7. JAMA library was used for all the matrix computations involved in the 
technique. The code has been divided into two modules, the Trainining Model Phase and 
the TestExecution phase. The training model processes the training dataset and the test 
execution is done on the threshold dataset and the test dataset. The system configuration is 
as follows. 
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Operating System: MacOS X version 10.9.3 
Processor: 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 
Memory: 16GB 
Program runtime for 1 User: 2101 milliseconds (35.01 seconds)  
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Chapter 6 
Comparison other techniques 
The statistical science research paper implemented by Prof. Schonlau [4] and other 
scientists has compared several other techniques on the same dataset. There is also a well-
defined comparison of these different statistical approaches. Each of these techniques have 
their own thresholds on the basis on which the false positives and negatives get calculated. 
The techniques are as follows: 
1. Uniqueness 
2. Bayes one-step Markov 
3. Hybrid multistep Markov 
4. Compression 
5. Sequence match 
6. IPAM 
 
The best performing techniques were the Bayes one-step and Hybrid multistep technique. 
Bayes one-step Markov: 
It is based on one-step transitions from one command to the next. It uses a Bayes factor 
statistic to test the null hypothesis that the observed one-step command transition 
probabilities [20]. 
Hybrid multistep Markov: 
It is a combination of markov chain and the independence model. Whenever Markov 
models become unusable on the dataset, in such cases a model of probabilities is used. 
Uniqueness:The uniqueness approach is based on the idea that commands not previously 
seen in the training. Data may indicate an attempted masquerade. Moreover, the fewer 
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users that are known to use that command, the more indicative that command is of a 
masquerade [20]. 
Compression: 
This technique creates a mapping of training set and the testing set to the amount of 
compression possible. The differentiating factor would be the fact that data different form 
the restricted set of training set would not compress as well as the training set [20]. 
IPAM (Incremental probabilistic action modeling): 
This technique depends on one step command change probabilities estimated using the 
training dataset. This model keeps updating itself with modifications to the training step 
updating the overall analysis [20]. 
Sequence Match: 
In this technique, a similarity measure is computed between the recent commands and the 
existing user’s profile. The user’s profile too is a sequence of 10 commands used by the user 
in the past. The similarity measure is a match comparison between the user profile and the 
new set of commands [20]. 
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Statistics of each technique: 
Method False Alarms(%) Missing Alarms(%) 
Uniqueness 1.4 60.6 
Bayes one-step Markov 6.7 30.7 
Hybrid multistep Markov 3.2 50.7 
Compression 5.0 65.8 
Sequence-Match 3.7 63.2 
IPAM 2.7 58.9 
SVD 4.0 26 
 
Table 4: Performance statistics of other technique [20] 
 Table 4 above shows the performance of other intrusion detection techniques 
compared to Singular value detection (SVD). As per the table 4 above, 4% is false alarms and 
26% for the missing alarms for SVD. This technique looks strong when looked at the data on 
missing alarms. The highlighted technique (SVD) in the table comes from the experiment 
performed in this project. 
As per their research, Hybrid multistep did the best followed by Bayes one step Markov and 
then comes Uniqueness. One of their observations in the results was that as the false alarm 
rate went down, the missing alarm rate went up. SVD thus proves to be better than Bayes 
one-step Markov, but poorer to Compression as far as false alarms are considered. In case of 
missing alarms, it is better than all the other techniques but slightly less efficient than Bayes 
one-step markov [20]. 
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ROC curves: 
 
                                          Figure 57: ROC for other technique [20] 
 
Figure 58: ROC for SVD 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Other machine learning techniques have been used in the past to carry out masquerade 
detection on user data. Our technique helps at user profile building, where per user analysis 
helps us to identify masqueraders for that particular user. This approach can help in the 
protection of a huge system where there are different users using a system. The admin can 
use the application to identify intrusions for a specific user at specific time instances. Our 
implementation works well on large datasets with huge variety in the dataset. It identifies 
crucial data points to create a small yet effective representation of the original dataset. We 
have done experiments on 50 different user’s dataset to validate the technique’s 
performance. The technique works fast and efficiently.  
One of the future improvements that can be done to this technique is adding the factor of 
conceptual drift to this technique. Conceptual drift is a concern in every machine learning 
technique, where every change in user behavior should not be considered as masquerade 
intrusion. Optimizations can be made to adapt to this change in user behavior, where there 
can be a distinguishing factor between user behavioral change and intruder actions. One of 
the approaches to achieve this can be done by updating the training model frequently using 
a certain kind of feedback mechanism on regular intervals. This help the system adapt to 
new changes in the user profile. 
Another improvement that could be done is real time dashboards that run the application 
on the log files in real time. Whenever there is a spike in the commands being tested on the 
SVD machine, alerts can be generated to warn the admin of the centralized or shared 
system. 
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